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Chapitre	13	The	Living	Species	is	Not	a	Natural	Kind	but	an	Intellectual	Construction		Philippe	GRANDCOLAS.		In:	Life	Sciences,	Information	Sciences,	First	Edition.	Edited	by	Thierry	Gaudin,	Dominique	Lacroix,	Marie-Christine	Maurel	and	Jean-Charles	Pomerol.	ISTE	Ltd	2018.	Published	by	ISTE	Ltd	and	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	Inc.	pp.	125-137			
13.1.	Introduction		In	biology,	the	species	is	probably	the	most	often	and	widely	used	notion.	All	scientific	work	on	life	refers	to	a	species’	name,	as	well	as	many	other	domains	of	civil	society	(nutrition,	health,	cosmetics,	environmental	management,	gardening,	etc.)	However,	the	notion	of	species	is	also	that	on	which	opinions	differ	the	most	at	the	conceptual	level.	To	give	a	measure	of	these	divergences,	we	quote	Mayden	[MAY	97]	who	identified	no	less	than	24	different	concepts	of	species.	Uncountable	pages	and	numerous	books	have	been	written	on	the	subject	(recently,	e.g.,	[STA	03,	WHE	00]).	Much	work	of	philosophy	of	science	puts	an	embarrassing	emphasis	on	the	contradictory	and	spirited	discussions	on	the	nature	of	a	species	[MAH	97,	RUS	87,	SOB	93].	The	relatively	confusing	sum	of	all	these	works	makes	it	difficult	for	scientists	to	fully	embrace	the	question	and	adopt	a	reflective	approach.	This	paradox	–	omnipresence	of	the	notion	and	absence	of	a	consensual	concept	–	is	a	problem.	In	the	largest	majority,	the	uses	of	the	notion	of	species	are	purely	operational	and	do	not	mention	any	concept,	which	could	limit	the	validity	of	the	results	or	the	data,	or	even	the	comparison	of	studies.	Clearly,	scientific	communication	concerning	life	can	be	problematic	due	to	the	issue	about	the	notion	of	species.	This	apparent	cacophony	is	not	the	result	of	a	lack	of	interest	or	perspicacity	on	the	part	of	biologists	but	rather	derives	from	the	accumulation	of	concepts	forged	at	different	times	by	different	disciplines	whose	objectives	and	tools	vary	or	evolve.		Some	people	have	attempted	to	combine	these	different	concepts	by	adopting	a	sympathetic	progressive	attitude:	the	species	is	like	a	complex	volume	in	the	dark	that	can	be	lit	up	from	different	angles	to	ascertain	its	shape.	Later,	we	will	see	that	this	attitude	can	create	problems	as	it	overestimates	the	reality	of	species	and	because	the	concepts	refer	to	different	situations	whose	compatibility	varies	greatly.	Finally,	the	problem	of	the	species	is	hidden	behind	a	name,	the	one	from	the	binomial	Linnean	nomenclature	that	gives	it	substance,	authority	and	often	prevents	deeper	awareness.	A	same	name,	especially	if	given	cleverly	in	Latin	with	the	authority	of	a	descriptor	taxonomist	[DUB	08a],	proclaims	a	sort	of	absolute	equivalence	that	would	erase	the	differences	between	concepts	of	species	and	would	be	far	too	easy	to	accept.	This	chapter	reviews	the	main	study	methods	used	for	evolution,	the	three	main	families	of	concepts	of	species	that	arise	from	these	and	finally	the	two	great	philosophical	concepts	on	the	nature	of	a	species.	To	finish,	we	look	at	how	to	treat	a	species	and	the	
consequences	of	its	use	within	the	scientific	community	and	its	communication	within	society.			
13.2.	Two	ways	to	study	evolution:	genealogy	versus	phylogeny		The	main	concepts	of	species	are	defined	in	the	context	of	evolutionary	biology.	To	understand	these	concepts,	it	is	therefore	necessary	to	first	clarify	the	two	main	methods	used	to	study	the	evolution,	each	addressing	a	different	level	and	study	method	(Figures	13.1	and	13.2).	The	level	of	genealogical	study	identifies	and	describes	the	relations	between	ancestors	and	descendants.	The	observations	inevitably	refer	to	individuals	(Figure	13.1).	They	are	either	direct	(the	observation	of	reproduction	and	the	birth	of	descendants)	or	indirect	(inferences	produced	by	population	genetics	methods).	The	diversity	of	genealogical	relationships	among	living	species	is	often	underestimated	due	to	our	anthropocentrism:	we	consider	a	priori	that	life	is	only	represented	by	pluricellular	organisms	with	bisexual	reproduction.	In	reality,	bacteria,	archaea	and	protists	represent	a	substantial	part	of	the	living	and	even	among	the	pluricellular,	the	modalities	of	reproduction	can	vary	with	parthenogenesis,	the	number	of	sexes	(often	greater	than	two),	gender	changes	through	development,	etc.	The	genealogical	level	of	study	is	the	oldest	and	the	most	easily	understood	with	anthropocentrism.	Man	has	applied	it	to	himself	for	millennia.	Breeders	construct	the	genealogy	of	many	animal	species	and	geneticists	have	formalized	them	since	the	beginning	of	the	20th	Century	[FIS	30].		 	
				Figure	13.1.	Genealogical	level	of	study	with	network	of	reproduction	relations	in	a	group	of	ancestors	and	descendants;	each	black	dot	is	an	individual	(adapted	from	[SAM	06])		 																				Figure	13.2.	Phylogenetic	tree	of	individuals	(E,	A,	B,	C)	representing	their	relative	and	nested	kinship	relations.	From	top	to	bottom:	samples,	character	matrices,	non-	rooted	then	rooted	on	the	E	individual	tree	and	finally	the	two	tree-solutions	showing	different	changes	in	the	state	of	characters.	B	and	C	are	sister-groups,	then	(B,	C)	is	a	sister-group	of	A.	(B,	C)	or	(A,	B,	C)	form	a	group	known	as	“monophyletic”		 	
	Studies	at	the	phylogenetic	level	describe	evolutionary	relationships	(called	sister-groups)	between	individuals	or	groups	of	individuals,	at	an	observable	level	where	genealogical	information	is	often	completely	missing	and	unknowable.	Evolutionary	relations	between	individuals,	known	as	phylogenies,	are	inferred	through	the	shared	presence	of	original	characteristics	(apomorphies)	and	are	described	in	a	relative	manner:	an	individual	is	a	closer	relative	to	another	individual	than	to	a	third	one	(Figure	13.2).	These	relative	evolutionary	relationships	are	hierarchically	nested:	they	are	represented	by	what	are	known	as	acyclic	connected	graphs	–	the	phylogenetic	trees	or	cladograms.	Building	these	trees	is	therefore	based	on	many	original	characteristics	carried	by	the	individuals	and	on	the	minimization	of	their	changes	of	states.	For	example,	horses	are	closer	relatives	to	humans	than	fishes,	which	is	attested	by	their	shared	possession	of	mammary	glands	and	specific	skeletal	characteristics	(jaw,	inner	ear,	etc.),	among	others.	Rejecting	this	inference	is	only	possible	if	supported	by	many	other	characteristics	that	prove	to	be	contradictory	to	those	of	mammary	glands	and	the	specific	skeletal	characteristics	(between	humans	and	fishes,	for	example).	The	process	of	minimization	(the	principle	of	parsimony)	of	changes	in	characteristics	is	now	often	carried	out	in	a	frequentist	or	Bayesian	probabilistic	context,	notably	for	molecular	data.	A	phylogenetic	tree	is	therefore	simply	a	graph,	a	representation	of	the	results	from	calculations	carried	out	on	a	matrix	[individuals	×	characteristics].	Many	misleading	conceptions	and	language	shortcuts	try	to	give	more	significance	to	this	graph	than	it	is	due,	considering	it	as	a	natural	kind,	or	as	an	image	representation	of	evolution;	thus,	some	people	refer	to	ancestors	at	tree	nodes	or	to	the	speciation	of	dichotomies.	Nothing	could	be	less	true:	potentially,	ancestral	states	of	characteristics	at	nodes	can	be	reconstructed	and	it	may	be	possible	to	study	speciation	using	a	phylogenetic	tree,	but	these	are	particular	uses	that	rely	on	the	tree	topology	rather	than	on	parts	of	or	on	the	substance	of	the	tree.	The	metaphor	of	genealogy	most	often	used	to	explain	phylogeny	is	particularly	fallacious:	in	phylogeny,	there	are	neither	ancestors	nor	descendants;	an	ancestor	at	a	given	level	is	unknowable	in	phylogeny	because	it	does	not	carry	a	single	original	characteristic	[ENG	77,	NEL	70].	Study	at	the	phylogenetic	level	is	very	recent	in	its	modern	methodological	dimension;	phylogenetic	analysis	was	formalized	by	Hennig	[HEN	66],	Kluge	and	Farris	[KLU	69]	and	Farris	[FAR	70].	This	level	of	study	still	requires	many	methodological	clarifications	with	an	aim	of	eradicating	all	genealogical,	essentialist	or	gradistic	connotation	[GRA	14].			
13.3.	Three	main	families	of	concepts	of	species		Rather	than	enumerating	them	exhaustively,	it	is	possible	to	consider	that	the	many	different	concepts	[MAY	97]	can	be	reassembled	into	three	main	groups	[DUB	11,	MAL	08a].		The	first	group	–	diagnostic	concepts	–	is	heterogeneous.	It	includes	the	first	essentialist	concepts	from	Aristotle	to	those	that	followed	(Linné,	Buffon,	etc.)	as	well	as	all	the	operational	groups	made	with	existing	individuals	in	the	absence	of	more	detailed	concepts.	It	involves	considering	that	two	groups	of	individuals	constitute	just	as	many	species	if	it	is	possible	to	find	diagnostic	characteristics	for	each	of	them.	This	group	of	concepts	is	limited	by	its	simplicity:	the	delimitation	of	groups	is	arbitrary;	it	
incorporates	no	or	little	theory	of	evolution	and	therefore	does	not	allow	for	the	testing	of	hypotheses	in	evolution	biology.	The	second	group	–	biological	concepts	–	is	often	attributed	to	the	biologist	Ernst	Mayr	[MAY	42].	It	is	based	on	the	rupture	from	the	principle	of	common	reproduction	and	the	adaptive	or	neutral	genetic	divergence	and	the	reproductive	isolation	that	should	result	from	it.	Two	populations	having	undergone	this	type	of	event	are	deemed	to	de	facto	become	two	different	species.	Most	geneticists	or	population	biologists	subscribe	to	this	group	of	concepts	that	make	the	most	sense	in	terms	of	the	scale	of	their	studies.	However,	this	group	of	concepts	remains	very	limited	by	two	problems,	one	theoretical	and	the	other	operational.	Theoretically,	the	ability	to	reproduce	together	is	an	ancestral	characteristic	[BRE	79,	ROS	78]	and	two	very	distant	species	are	frequently	able	to	reproduce,	often	with	success.	Think	of	ligers,	walphins,	camas	and	other	zonkeys,	not	to	mention	one-quarter	of	the	European	flowering	plant	species	or	one-tenth	of	bird	species	hybrids	[MAL	08a].	The	ultimate	paradox	disfavoring	this	concept	is	that	hybridization	between	what	are	considered	as	different	species	is	often	an	engine	of	speciation,	notably	in	plants.	The	criteria	for	reproduction	that	would	define	a	species	is	therefore	too	idealistic	to	be	pertinent.	At	the	operational	level,	we	must	remember	that	this	criterion	only	concerns	a	few	organisms	among	all	of	the	living:	those	that	are	plurisexual,	especially	those	whose	reproduction	or	genetic	structure	is	observable,	therefore	only	existing	organisms	excluding	fossils	(that	represent	99.9%	of	the	species	that	have	existed!).	For	example,	let	us	remember	that	the	first	discovery	of	fossil	traces	of	copulation	in	vertebrates	is	very	recent	[JOY	12].	The	third	group	–	phylogenetic	concepts	–	is	the	most	recent	[BAU	92,	CRA	83].	It	consists	of	anchoring	diagnostic	concepts	in	a	phylogenetic	context:	the	diagnostic	characteristics	of	each	species	become	the	apomorphic	characteristics	supporting	monophyletic	phylogenetic	groups	(including	all	descendants	from	a	common	ancestor).	These	concepts	are	coherent	with	the	historical	and	evolutionary	context;	they	are	applicable	to	all	individuals	without	restriction	(existing	vs.	fossil,	for	example).	They	also	have	the	advantage	of	being	predictors	of	genetic	or	phenotypic	diversity,	with	the	possible	use	of	the	phylogenetic	diversity	(PD)	metric	[FAI	92,	PEL	16].	They	can	also	be	viewed	as	a	modern	formalization	of	Simpson’s	concept	of	evolving	species	[SIM	61]	that	has	remained	defective	since	its	formulation,	due	to	a	lack	of	phylogenetic	methodologies.	A	single	concern	remains:	where	do	we	put	the	limit	between	species?			
13.4.	Reconciling	the	different	concepts:	pragmatism	or	essentialism?		What	is	the	theoretical	compatibility	between	these	groups	of	concepts?	It	is	easy	to	see	that	it	is	not	complete.	Phylogenetic	species	have	often	proven	to	show	traces	of	genetic	introgression,	implying	that	they	do	not	correspond	to	closed	communities	of	reproduction.	For	example,	Nattier	et	al.	[NAT	12]	led	a	study	on	the	origins	of	restricted	distribution	(micro-endemism)	in	groups	of	insects	in	New	Caledonia.	For	more	than	20	million	years,	this	group	diversified	through	allopatric	speciation;	the	distribution	area	of	ancient	species	–	much	reduced	in	the	beginning	–	increased	in	size,	creating	secondary	sympatries	that	gave	rise	to	interspecies	reproduction	whose	traces	are	found	in	certain	molecular	markers.	Conversely,	it	is	commonly	found	that	biological	species	are	not	monophyletic	[FUN	03].	
To	compensate	for	this	lack	of	complete	compatibility	and	the	clear	disadvantage	of	recognizing	pluralism	in	the	notion	of	species,	several	scientists	have	conceived	another	kind	of	reconciliation	between	concepts:	a	composite	concept	called	the	lineage-species	concept	[DE	98,	SAM	06].	These	authors	think	that	in	time,	a	specific	lineage	successively	encompasses	first	the	phylogenetic	species,	then	the	biological	species,	once	reproductive	isolation	is	secondarily	acquired.	The	incompatibilities	raised	at	a	time	t	(see	above)	are	only	noted	because	they	are	observed	at	different	moments	in	a	situation	that	involves	several	steps.	This	elegant	proposition	actually	involves	a	very	particular	model	of	evolution	in	which	reproductive	isolation	is	acquired	last,	that	is,	far	from	universal.	In	some	cases,	reproductive	isolation	can	be	acquired	first	or	secondarily	lost	in	cases	of	extrinsic	(geographic)	isolation,	also	intervening	secondarily.	In	addition,	the	phylogenetic	species	does	not	necessarily	evolve	fully	into	a	biological	species.	The	proposal	of	a	composite	lineage-species	concept	that	can	be	considered	as	holistic	or	consensual	therefore	also	has	the	disadvantage	of	leading	to	the	thought	that	a	species	“truly	exists”	or	will	“truly”	exist	in	an	ulterior	stage	of	evolution	(once	reproductive	isolation	is	acquired):	it	falls	back	to	a	somewhat	essentialist	way	of	thinking.	If	the	lineage-species	concept	is	adopted,	in	fact	only	the	observed	stage	of	a	given	situation	is	adopted.	In	its	entirety,	the	concept	remains	virtual	and	only	holds	sense	through	the	syncretism	of	the	different	situations	studied.	It	also	hides	the	difficulty	of	considering	all	observations	or	inferences	carried	out	at	various	study	levels,	populational	and	phylogenetic,	and	that	ultimately	do	not	refer	to	the	same	realities.			
13.5.	The	species	and	the	taxon	name		No	matter	the	species	concept	referred	to	(or	not!),	the	species-taxon	name	is	inevitably	used.	This	is	a	Latin	binome	followed	by	the	name	of	its	author	(e.g.	Taraxacum	officinale	Weber,	Blattella	germanica	L.)	and	whose	qualities	and	rules	of	use	are	defined	by	the	respective	nomenclature	codes	of	zoologists,	botanists	and	microbiologists	[DUB	08b].	The	species-taxon	name	finds	itself	in	the	inclusive	hierarchy	of	taxonomic	categories:	species,	genus,	family,	sub-family,	order,	class,	etc.,	that	form	a	classification.	The	nomenclature	rules	associate	this	species-taxon	name	to	a	specific	individual,	the	name-bearing	type	or	holotype,	more	correctly	called	onomatophore.	There	is	therefore	a	logical	correspondence	between	species-	taxon	<->	name	<->	holotype.	Far	from	a	typological	view	of	organisms,	this	principle	aims	to	prevent	all	later	errors	linked	to	the	erroneous	grouping	of	individuals:	a	single	organism-individual	bears	the	name.	During	the	subsequent	identification	process,	this	taxon	name	is,	by	extension,	attributed	to	one	or	more	individuals	based	on	diagnostic	characteristics	put	forward	during	description.	The	Latin	binomial	name	is	therefore	just	a	convenient	label	but	through	the	years	it	has	given	substance	to	the	species	in	the	mind’s	spirit	and	sometimes	substituted	the	definition	of	a	species	concept.	Notably,	the	identification	process	that	can	be	applied	to	all	concerned	organism-individuals	leads	to	the	idea	that	the	species	notion	is	linked	to	a	finite	group	of	individuals,	that	its	boundaries	can	therefore	be	perfectly	known	and	that,	therefore,	a	concept	is	involved.	Certain	bionominalist	conceptions	feed	on	such	confusion,	thinking	that	creating	names	and	a	classification	necessitates	only	that	the	entities	designated	by	taxa	have	well-	defined	biological	natures	(see,	e.g.,	[MAH	97]).	It	must	be	understood	that	taxonomic	work	on	the	“description	of	a	species”	is	simply	a	process	that	consists	of	selecting	a	name-bearing	type	and	defining	a	list	of	diagnostic	
characteristics	that	either	subordinate	it	or	distinguish	it	from	preexisting	taxa.	As	such,	taxonomy	is	non-ambiguous,	permitting	the	classification	and	subsequent	identification	of	taxa.	In	reality,	classification	and	taxonomy	are	simple	language	conventions	that	do	not	necessitate	specific	conceptual	choices	in	terms	of	the	species.	In	the	extreme,	it	is	even	possible	to	imagine	a	completely	utilitarian	classification	in	which	that	taxa	are	innumerable	drawers	in	a	cabinet	library	and	do	not	have	any	particular	significance.	Let	us	therefore	imagine	a	library	organized	in	chronological	order	of	work	acquisition	rather	than	by	subject.	Of	course,	a	“natural”	classification	with	an	evolutionary	and	biological	logic	would	be	much	more	informative	and	useful,	just	as	access	to	a	library	organized	by	subjects	or	authors	would	be	much	easier	and	more	informative.	Nevertheless,	as	much	as	it	is	preferable	to	follow	an	evolutionary	classification,	it	also	draws	general	utilitarian	strength	by	not	being	directly	and	automatically	dependent	on	versatile	evolutionary	theories	(e.g.	contradictory	phylogenetic	trees)	that	would	continually	modify	it.			
13.6.	The	nature	of	species:	a	salutatory	philosophical	exercise	
	Philosophers	and	biologists	who	pride	themselves	on	philosophy	have	long	discussed	the	nature	of	living	species.	This	debate	on	nature	is	not	only	a	point	of	philosophical	theory,	as	many	biologists	are	often	happy	to	think.	It	also	sheds	light	on	the	discussion	on	species	concepts	and	vice	versa.	Three	main	concepts	on	the	nature	of	species	have	emerged:	the	species	as	a	natural	kind,	the	species	as	an	individual	and	the	species	as	a	class	[RUS	87].	The	species	as	a	natural	kind	has	renewed	itself	since	Aristotle	and	Locke	and	their	essentialist	concepts.	Today,	it	is	defended	as	such	in	a	materialist	ontology	(e.g.	[MAH	97])	through	the	conjunction	of	several	properties	or	laws	that	are	linked	in	a	constant	and	real	manner.	However,	species	do	not	show	such	characteristics,	they	are	polymorphous,	variable	and,	most	notably,	they	evolve	and	do	not	constantly	have	these	characteristics.	The	natural	kind	concept,	whose	most	frequently	quoted	example	refers	to	the	elements	of	the	periodic	table,	is	not	in	accordance	with	biological	reality,	even	if	perceived	through	the	prism	of	one	or	another	species	concept.	To	support	this	theory,	Boyd	[BOY	91]	and	then	Griffith	[GRI	99]	rearranged	the	concept	of	the	natural	kind	into	“homeostatic	property	cluster	kinds”,	an	“elastic	class”	whose	variability	is	compensated	for	by	the	continuity	of	homeostatic	properties	that	guarantee	its	integrity.	Such	rearrangement	kills	the	concept	of	the	natural	kind	and	renders	it	trivial.	The	species	as	an	individual	was	recently	claimed	[GHI	74,	HUL	78]	as	a	solution	to	the	inadequacy	of	the	natural	kind.	An	individual	is	restricted	in	space	and	time:	it	has	a	beginning	and	an	end.	An	interesting	consequence	is	that	an	organism-individual	can	then	become	part	of	the	species-individual	instead	of	being	a	member	of	a	kind.	Organisms	are	therefore	more	causally	linked	(matched?)	than	similar.	Here	again,	there	is	a	difficulty	in	adopting	this	nature	of	a	species.	In	fact,	organisms	of	a	species	lack	cohesion:	they	are	not	part	of	a	unified	whole	but	are	simply	linked	by	potential	reproduction	relationships.	In	addition,	the	genealogical	link	is	not,	strictly	speaking,	causal.	Identifying	the	beginning	and	end	of	a	species	falls	back	on	limiting	it	precisely	in	space	and	time	with	all	its	organism-individuals,	which	is	biologically	incompatible	with	the	different	concepts.	It	is	understood	that	this	is	more	an	analogy	than	a	characterization.		
We	see	that	these	different	natures	are	forced	to	adjust	to	species	concepts	with	which	they	do	not	fit.	Their	point	in	common	is	their	attempt	to	reify	species	and	give	them	a	tangible	biological	reality,	beyond	the	biological	concepts	describing	the	loose	and	close	relations	between	individuals	or	the	historical	phylogenetic	diagnoses	that	simply	give	a	final	score	of	the	relations	between	groups	of	organism-	individuals.	Why	not	ultimately	characterize	species	as	a	less	tangible	group,	an	extensional	class	(see	class	definition	according	to	[MAH	97])	thus	characterized	by	the	statement	of	one	or	more	properties	common	to	a	set	of	individuals.	These	properties	would	simply	be	diagnostic	characteristics	to	which	the	status	of	law	or	invariant	would	not	be	attached:	for	example	the	ability	to	reproduce	together,	the	list	of	apomorphic	characteristics.	This	characterization	that	could	be	qualified	as	nominalist	(in	its	strict	sense)	would,	in	addition,	be	compatible	with	the	pluralist	view	of	species,	recognizing	the	validity	and	particularity	of	each	family	of	concepts,	whether	biological	or	phylogenetic.	It	is	therefore	possible	to	formulate	different,	partially	compatible	classes	corresponding	to	each	family	of	concepts.	Biologically,	this	solution	leads	to	the	postulate	that	the	only	reality	is	the	organism-individual	(the	one	that	is	observable	from	one’s	window,	not	the	one	whose	structure	is	inferred)	and	its	relationships	with	other	organism-individuals,	as	many	times	and	in	as	diverse	ways	as	they	can	be	characterized	in.	Historically,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	this	solution	is	closer	to	Darwin’s	concepts,	remarkably	significant	and	economical	in	hypothesis	[MAL	08a,	MAL	08b,	STA	13].		Consider	species	as	a	simple	extensional	class	that	has	the	following	consequences:	–	the	name	of	the	species	carried	by	the	name-bearing	type	(onomatophore)	is	attributed	through	the	process	of	identification	to	a	class	of	organism-individuals;	ideally,	such	an	attribution	would	require	detailing	the	species	concept	used	and	would	remain	dependent	on	this	concept:	with	the	identification	operation,	the	field	of	classification	–	the	species-taxon	free	from	biological	theory	–	is	combined	with	that	of	evolutionary	biology	–	a	defined	concept	of	species;	–	all	judicial	notions	linked	to	a	species	name	designate	the	name-bearing	type	and	its	identified	conspecifics;	–	it	is	necessary	to	revisit	all	the	analyses	in	evolutionary	biology	and	to	realize	that	they	are	only	truly	relevant	in	terms	of	organism-individuals	(contra	[WHE	00]);	phylogenetic	studies	study	the	evolutionary	relationships	between	individuals,	even	if	they	use	characteristics	that	are	quite	invariable	among	the	individuals	attributed	to	different	species-classes.	The	concept	of	speciation	must	be	well-understood:	it	does	not	correspond	to	species	individualization	but	to	a	change	in	relationships	between	individuals,	etc.	–	the	character	postulated	and	conditional	on	the	identification	operation	also	requires	that	information	linked	to	the	living	species	be	used	and	conserved	at	the	organism-individual	level;	this	is	the	notion	of	“saving	information”	that	underpins	the	conservation	of	the	organism-individual	similar	to	so	many	specimens	in	collections	[GRA	17];	–	empirically,	due	to	the	fact	that	a	large	majority	of	species	are	defined	operationally	and	in	a	purely	taxonomic	and	diagnostic	manner,	they	can	be	considered	to	issue	from	the	phylogenetic	species	concept,	provided	that	the	classification	is	natural	(that	is	to	say	that	the	diagnoses	are	established	from	characteristics	that	are	known,	from	phylogenetic	analyses,	to	be	apomorphic	at	the	level	concerned).	
There	remains	one	thing	to	say	with	regard	to	the	delimitation	of	species.	We	have	seen	that	in	terms	of	the	different	concepts,	none	of	them	guarantees	an	unequivocal	delimitation.	The	shared	criterion	of	reproduction	is	far	from	absolute	and	the	criterion	of	monophyly	does	not	prescribe	where	to	cut	off	two	species.	In	both	cases,	the	method	is	the	same:	discontinuities	that	appear	significant	are	used	to	make	species	statements	(e.g.	[MAL	08a]):	defining	classes	is	an	easier	task	when	based	on	relatively	constant	differences	and	particularities.	Since	Darwin	[DAR	59],	it	has	been	understood	in	addition	that	these	apparent	discontinuities	between	groups	of	individuals	called	species	are	the	combined	result	of	divergences	and	extinctions	[MAL	08a,	MAL	08b].	For	example,	delimitation	methods	have	been	proposed	based	on	hiatus	in	the	overall	similarity	between	molecular	markers	[PUI	12].	It	goes	without	saying	that	this	type	of	delimitation	carries	a	strong	arbitrariness	but	remains	legitimate	in	the	context	of	the	definition	of	a	simple	class	(neither	a	natural	kind,	nor	an	individual).	The	authors	generally	argued	for	the	biological	legitimacy	of	the	characteristics	used	for	species	delimitation:	such	and	such	anatomical	characteristic	is	supposedly	less	adapted	(less	suspected	of	convergence?),	more	adapted	(more	stable?),	a	genetic	characteristic	(e.g.	a	DNA	barcode)	rather	than	phenotypic	(stronger	heritability,	more	prone	to	statistical	analysis?),	etc.	There	are,	of	course,	many	assumptions	in	such	arguments	and	it	must	simply	be	remembered	that	it	is	more	coherent	to	justify	characteristics	used	with	regard	to	the	species	concept	followed	rather	than	in	terms	of	pure	operationality.	This	would	lead	to	the	selection	of	apomorphic	characteristics	in	the	case	of	the	phylogenetic	concept	or	linked	to	reproduction	in	the	case	of	the	biological	species.	In	this	manner,	the	definition	of	a	species	is	the	result	of	a	specific	study	that	consequently	proposes	a	simple	extensional	class.	The	species	is	therefore	not	discovered	as	a	tangible	entity,	it	is	not	subject	to	evolution	[MAL	08a,	MAL	08b]:	to	be	clear,	we	cannot	speak	of	the	evolution	of	a	species	and	that	which	evolves,	these	are	the	relationships	between	organism-individuals.	The	title	of	Darwin’s	famous	book	–	The	Origin	of	Species	–	must	be	understood	as	a	metaphor	and	not	as	a	demonstration	per	se.			
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